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THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN MISDEMEANOR CASES
by Carl W. McKinzie
I. INTRODUCTION
The need for counsel in a criminal case was clearly expressed by
Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama when he stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelli-
gent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel
he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
The need to be represented by counsel is, however, to be distinguished
from the right to be so represented.
A defendant's right to be represented by counsel in criminal pro-
ceedings has been in issue at common law for centuries.' Develop-
ment of this right has been gradual. Recently, however, major strides
have been made in its evolution. The sixth amendment's guarantee'
of the right to counsel "in all criminal prosecutions" definitely estab-
lishes that this right exists in the United States. Interpretation of this
guarantee has left many constitutional questions unanswered. When
does the right to counsel begin? When does it end? Does it apply
only to felonies or is it also applicable to misdemeanors? If applicable
to misdemeanors, will it encompass all misdemeanors or only the more
serious ones?
It is the purpose of this comment to examine one phase of the
constitutional problem: the right of the indigent defendent to court-
appointed counsel in a misdemeanor case. An attempt will be made
to trace the development of the right to counsel in misdemeanor
cases through both federal and state courts, to analyze the decisions,
1 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
'IV BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 354-55 (1807).
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
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and to draw conclusions about their application. It is important to
the development of this topic, however, to first study the evolution
of the right to counsel in felony cases.
II. FELONY CASES
A. English Common Law4
In early England, a defendant charged with a felony or treason
was denied the aid of counsel, except as to legal questions which the
defendant himself might suggest. The practice of English judges,
however, was to permit counsel to confer with a defendant as to
the conduct of the defendant's case, and to represent him in collateral
matters and with regard to questions of law arising at the trial. At
the same time, parties in civil cases and persons accused of misde-
meanors were entitled to the full assistance of counsel.'
A statute passed in 16958 permitted one accused of treason the
privilege of being heard by counsel, but the rule forbidding the
participation of counsel on indictments for felony stood until 1836.'
Much controversy apparently existed prior to passage of the statute
in 1836 concerning a rule which permitted the aid of counsel in
petty offenses, but denied this aid in "crimes of the gravest char-
acter."'
Colonial America was unreceptive to this phase of its English
heritage. In at least twelve of the thirteen colonies, the rule of
English common law was "definitely rejected and the right to counsel
fully recognized in all criminal prosecutions, save that in one or two
instances the right was limited to capital offenses or to the more
serious crimes. . ,, The adoption of the sixth amendment, therefore,
came at a time when England was just beginning to permit retained
counsel in felony cases.
B. Federal Courts
Prior to 1938, doubt existed in the United States whether the
"The material presented in this section of the paper is derived from the historical
analysis of the Court as presented in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); and in
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONs 698 (8th ed. 1927).
e7 Wm. III, chap. 3, S 1.
6 & 7 Wm. IV, chap. 114, § 1 and 2. This statute accorded the right to defend by
counsel against summary convictions and charges of felony.
'Blackstone, in 1758, denounced the rule as not in keeping with the humane treat-
ment of prisoners under English law. He stated: "For upon what face of reason can that
assistance be denied to have the life of a man, which yet is allowed him in prosecution for
every petty trespass?" IV Bl. Com. 355 (1807). Lord Coke defended the rule asserting
that the court itself was counsel for the prisoner. 1 COOLEY, supra note 5.
'Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 64-65.
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"right" to counsel merely insured the defendant's privilege to retain
counsel in criminal cases, or whether the defendant could also de-
mand that counsel be appointed by the court if he were indigent.
In 1938, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst'° resolved the con-
flict, holding that under the sixth amendment the defendant in a
federal felony prosecution has a right to court-appointed counsel,
unless competently and intelligently waived, if for financial or other
reasons he is unable to secure counsel himself." The Johnson v.
Zerbst rule was later interpreted to mean that in federal prosecutions
counsel had to be provided "at every step of the proceedings"" and
that it was not limited to felonies. 3
The holding of the Johnson case is the basis of Rule 44 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides: "If the de-
fendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him
of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every
stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel
or is able to obtain counsel."' 4 The Criminal Justice Act of 1964,"
requires each United States district court to institute a plan for
furnishing representation for defendants charged with felonies or
misdemeanors other than petty offenses. The legislative history of
this statute includes the following statement by President Kennedy
10304 U.S. 458 (1938).
" The Court summarized:
If the accused, however, is not represented by counsel and has not compe-
tently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment
stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him
of his life or his liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of the trial
may be lost "in the course of the proceedings" due to failure to complete the
court-as the Sixth Amendment requires-by providing counsel for an accused
who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived this consti-
tutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement
of the Sixth Amendment is not compiled with, the court no longer has juris-
diction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court with-
out jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by
habeas corpus. 304 U.S. at 468. (Emphasis added.)
s"Edwards v. United States, 139 F.2d 365, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 769 (1944).
The phrase, every step of the proceedings, does not refer to mere lapses of
time. It contemplates effective aid of counsel in the preparation and trial of
the case. It is true that denial, for a long time, of opportunity for conference
and consultation with counsel, might result in a deprivation of the Constitu-
tion's guarantee of assistance. Ordinarily this would be manifested in in-
adequate representation at the preliminary hearing, at the arraignment, during
the progress of the trial, or in connection with the filing of notice of appeal,
settling the bill of exceptions, designating the record and assigning errors.
Supra at 367-68.
"See Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942); note 44 infra and accompanying
text.
14 FED. R. CRiM. P. 44.
1578 Star. 552 (1964), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
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in his State of the Union address on January 14, 1963: "The right
to competent counsel must be assured every man accused of crime
in a Federal court regardless of his means."' 6 Thus, the constitutional
mandate that "the accused shall have the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense" has been recognized and pro-
vided for in federal felony cases.
C. State Courts
State constitutions early provided that a defendant in a criminal
case should have the right to be represented by counsel retained by
him." Apparently this was done to prevent the inequity which re-
sulted from the early English practices. Appointment of counsel,
however, was discretionary with the judge."
The Bill of Rights, however, is not directly applicable to state court
procedures. Therefore, an attack upon a state statute as being vio-
lative of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution must
be predicated on the due process or equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. Considerable controversy currently exists
as to whether the same federal standard as contained in the Bill of
Rights (e.g., the sixth amendment's right to counsel) is to be applied
to the states through the due process clause, or whether the due
process standard is broader, thus permitting the states to experiment."
In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama,' the Court first applied the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the question of the
right to counsel in state criminal proceedings. The Court stated:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel,
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a
necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not dis-
charged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances
as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial
of the case."'
Though the holding was based on and clearly limited to the trial
6 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 2990-91 (1964).
'" Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 61-64.
8 BEANY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 25 (1955).
" As indicated by Professor Paul A. Freund of the Harvard School of Law at a recent
lecture given at Southern Methodist University School of Law (April 15, 1965), reason
would seem to prefer a standard permitting the state courts to experiment, but this is
apparently not the current trend of Supreme Court decisions. An illustration permitting
such experimentation was the federal requirement compelling the federal officer to knock
before entering with a search warrant. If the states are held to the same standard, they must
also knock; but if allowed to experiment, perhaps they could enter without knocking.
'0287 U.S. 45 (1932).
"' Id. at 71. (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 19:593
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court's failure to make effective appointment" of counsel in a capital
case, the language of Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion" pointed to-
ward the existence of a right to counsel in noncapital cases.
Ten years later, in Betts v. Brady,24 the Court extended the right
to appointed counsel to noncapital cases. The Court held that while
the "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to
a fair trial,'" in special circumstances," the absence of counsel may
result in a conviction lacking in fundamental fairness. It is only
when these special circumstances exist that the denial of the rights
guaranteed by a specific provision of the Bill of Rights also would
be a denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment. The
Court held that no definite criteria could be established as to when
the right to appointed counsel arises since the concept of due process
is "less rigid and more fluid"27 than the requirements of the first
eight amendments. The asserted denial of the right was to be "tested
by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case."2
Gradual erosions were made on the special circumstance rule of
Betts v. Brady so that, in time, it became little more than an "in-
cantation to be pronounced by the Court before reversing a state
conviction."2 In fact, no denial had been affirmed by the Court
since 1950.20 The Court demonstrated increasing sensitivity to the
disadvantages imposed on indigent defendants by state procedures
for post-conviction relief. Procedures that conditioned habeas corpus
relief on payment of a filing fee"' or made purchase of a trial record
in effect a condition to effective appellate review" were struck down.
22 The trial court's appointment of the entire local bar and the latter's subsequent inaction
was not an effective appointment. Id. at 53-57.
" See text accompanying note I supra.
24316 U.S. 455 (1942).
2 Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, pointed out that the question of ap-
pointment of counsel had been settled by legislative policy in different ways in the various
states and that at common law there existed no right to appointed counsel. These two facts
were used to support the proposition that the "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental
right, essential to a fair trial." Id. at 471. The Court concluded that "while want of counsel
in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we
cannot say that the Amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any of-
fense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not
represented by counsel." Id. at 473.
" The Court used the phrase "certain circumstances." This phrase was termed the "special
circumstances rule" and was the constitutional standard in right to counsel cases until the
Gideon decision.
2' 316 U.S. at 462.
'a Ibid.
" The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. REv. 62, 103-04 (1963).
"°See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
55 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
a Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
1965 ]
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These and similar rulings set the stage for overturning the special
circumstances rule altogether.
Twenty-one years after its adoption, a unanimous Court in Gideon
v. Wainwright"3 expressly overruled the "special circumstance" rule
stating:
We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior
cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and
essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory on the States by the Four-
teenth Amendment. We think that the Court in Betts v. Brady was
wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee
of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights."
Gideon, an indigent, was convicted of a noncapital felony in a Florida
court after requesting and being denied appointed counsel. The
reversal of Gideon's conviction made it mandatory that counsel for
indigents be supplied when requested in state criminal proceedings
and not merely when special circumstances would make trial without
counsel "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fair-
ness."'" The effect of Gideon may further be to place the federal
standards of Johnson v. Zerbst upon the state courts."
In Texas, many judges have been appointing attorneys to repre-
sent indigents in felony cases for thirty years." This practice was
made state law in 1957 when article 494 of the Texas Code of Crim-
inal Procedure s was enacted. Prior to 1957, appointment of counsel
was required only in capital cases and in cases where a guilty plea
was entered before the court.' Texas courts have applied Gideon
"3372 U.S. 335 (1963).
341 d. at 342.
3s Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
' Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority in Gideon states: "We have construed
this [the sixth amendment] to mean that in federal courts counsel must be provided for
defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and intelligently waived
. . . . We think the Court in Betts had ample precedent for acknowledging that those guar-
tees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal
abridgment are equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 372 U.S. at 339-41.
" Schieffer, Lawyers Are for Poor People Too, 28 TEXAS BAR J. 275 (1965).
s""Whenever it is made known to the court at an arraignment or any other time that
an accused charged with a felony is too poor to employ a counsel, the court shall appoint
one (1) or more practicing attorneys to defend him." TEx. CoDE CarM. PRoc. art. 494, as
amended (1957).
Article 26.04 of the new Texas Criminal Code, effective January 1, 1966, supersedes arti-
cle 494 and compels the appointment of counsel for indigents charged with misdemeanors
punishable by imprisonment as well as for felonies. TEX. CODE CUDM. PROC. art. 26.05, 5 3
(1965).
' Morrison, Recent Decisions Requiring the Appointment of Counsel at Trial and on
Appeal, 28 TEXAs BAR J. 23, 70 (1965).
[Vol. 19:593
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retrospectively' to noncapital felony cases tried prior to the enact-
ment of article 494. Apparently the major remaining problem fac-
ing the courts in felony cases will be interpreting just when the
right to counsel begins, though the problem of when the right to
counsel ends may also prove troublesome. "1
III. MISDEMEANOR CASES
A. Federal Courts
Few federal standards are to be found with regard to misde-
meanors. Perhaps the most important such standard is the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964 " which divides public offenses into three cate-
gories: (1) felonies, (2) misdemeanors, and (3) petty offenses.
The offenses are defined as follows:
Notwithstanding any Act of Congress to the contrary: (1) Any offense
punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
is a felony. (2) Any other offense is a misdemeanor. (3) Any misde-
meanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a
period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both is a
petty offense.'3
The 1964 Act provides for the appointment of counsel in all cases
other than petty offenses.
1. Misdemeanors other than Petty Offenses Though no doubt exists
that a defendant accused of any of the three types of offenses has a
right to be represented by retained counsel, the Supreme Court has
never directly held that a right exists to have court-appointed counsel
in a misdemeanor case.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Evans v.
Rives" expressly held that the Johnson v. Zerbst rule was applicable
to misdemeanors, that is, that a federal district court must appoint
counsel for an indigent accused of a misdemeanor unless his right is
competently and intelligently waived. Evans was sentenced to serve
one year under a conviction of the juvenile court for the crime of
"Ex Pare Davis, 379 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964); Ex Parte Hamilton, 376
S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964); Ex Parte Bushnell, 375 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App.
1964); Ex Parte Parsons, 374 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964); Ex Parte Hope, 374
S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
41 Though the Court of Criminal Appeals has not had an opportunity to interpret Doug-
las v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), fully in an opinion, in Donaldson v. State, 372
S.W.2d 339, Douglas was cited as requiring the appointment of counsel on appeal. The issue
of when the right to counsel ends (i.e., does the right go beyond the first appeal) has not
been decided.
4278 Stat. 552 (1964), as amended, 18 U.S.A. S 3006A (1964).
4 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
4 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cit. 1942).
1965]
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refusing to provide for support and maintenance of a minor child,
a misdemeanor. The defendant pled guilty and was not advised
that he could have a lawyer nor that he was waiving his right to
counsel. On appeal, the court refused to accept the argument that
the charge was not of such a serious nature as to bring into opera-
tion the constitutional guarantee of a right to appointed counsel and
stated:
No such differentiation is made in the wording of the guaranty itself,
and we are cited to no authority, and know of none, making this dis-
tinction. The purpose of the guaranty is to give assurance against de-
privation of life or liberty except strictly according to law. The
petitioner would be as effectively deprived of his liberty by a sentence
to a year in jail for the crime of non-support of a minor child as by
a sentence to a year in jail for any other crime, however serious. And
so far as the right to the assistance of counsel is concerned, the Con-
stitution draws no distinction between loss of liberty for a short period
and such loss for a long one."
The Criminal Justice Act now makes this point moot as to misde-
meanors other than petty offenses. Likewise, Rule 44 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure seems to have been applicable to misde-
meanors, and as stated, is now clearly applicable under the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964. This is not true, however, with respect to
cases involving petty offenses.
2. Petty Offenses The right to trial by jury provided by the sixth
amendment has been held not to extend to petty offenses since the
guarantee is applicable only to those cases in which the right had
been recognized at common law."' It has been argued"' that the hold-
ing that a jury trial is not required implies that representation by
appointed counsel is not a prerequisite to a fair trial in a petty offense
case. Although the right to counsel has not paralleled the right to
trial by jury, this may well become a persuasive analogy in the eyes
of the courts.
The petty federal offense is specifically excluded from the benefits
conferred by the Criminal Justice Act of 1964. Not only are funds
not provided for court-appointed attorneys, but no duty is placed
upon the United States commissioner or the court to advise the de-
41 id. at 638.
" District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195
U.S. 65 (1904). This rule has been recently reaffirmed in United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S.
689, 695 (1964). For a thorough treatment of the problem, see Frankfurter and Corcoran,
Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REV.
917 (1926).
"'District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
48 Note, 43 B.U.L. Ruv. 570, 574 (1963).
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fendant that he has the right to be represented by counsel.49 This
treatment of the petty offender would seem to squarely raise the
constitutional issue: if a right to court-appointed counsel exists in
a misdemeanor case, does it exist with regard to all offenses or merely
the more serious misdemeanors? The Fifth Circuit, in a recent case,5°
applying the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to a
state prosecution in which an indigent defendant had been denied
the assistance of counsel, held the state procedure and consequently
the maximum ninety-day period of incarceration unconstitutional.
If this is to become the standard for state courts under the fourteenth
amendment, surely the federal courts must be held to at least as
demanding a standard under the sixth amendment. If this be true,
the portion of the Criminal Justice Act relating to petty offenses
would appear to be unconstitutional if literally applied.
B. State Courts
Gideon v. Wainwright5 has established that an indigent defendant
is entitled to be represented by court-appointed counsel in felony
cases. This decision leaves unsettled, however, the question of whether
it is a violation of due process for a state to deny appointment of
counsel in a non-felony case.
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that a definitional
problem exists from state to state in the labeling of offenses. Whether
or not Gideon extends to misdemeanors is really a false question, for
what is termed a felony in one state may be labeled a misdemeanor
in another."2 Compounding the problem created by the felony-
misdemeanor classification is the fact that though a crime be labeled
as a misdemeanor in all jurisdictions or as a felony in all jurisdictions,
the punishment assessed within the classification may vary greatly
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction."3
49 "In every criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a felony or a misde-
meanor, other than a petty offense, and appears without counsel, the United States com-
missioner or the court shall advise the defendant that he has the right to be represented by
counsel and that counsel will be appointed to represent him if he is financially unable to
obtain counsel." § 3006A (b). (Emphasis added.)
'Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (Sth Cir. 1965). See text accompanying note 83
infra.
51 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5 For example, adultery, a statutory crime in most jurisdictions, is classed as a felony in
some (see, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 1, art. 3, § 13-221 (1956)) and as a misdemeanor
in others. (See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 21, § 907 (Supp. 1963)).
" Illustrating this is the offense of hazing which is a misdemeanor in both New York
and Colorado, yet the penalties which may be assessed are widely divergent. In Colorado, the
misdemeanant, may be fined not less than $5 nor more than $50; no incarceration whatever
is provided for. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, art. 2, S 38 (1963). In New York, a de-
fendant found guilty of hazing may be fined not less than $10 nor more than $100, or




The pre-Gideon "special circumstances" test of Betts v. Brady
seems to have had application in several states to a misdemeanor
count when the circumstances proved "offensive to the common and
fundamental ideas of fairness."'
In 1951, the Supreme Court of Indiana in Bolkovac v. State' held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment compelled
court-appointed counsel in the misdemeanor case before the court.
The defendant had been convicted of child neglect, sentenced to a
term of 180 days and fined one dollar. The facts indicated that the
defendant was an uneducated layman and knew nothing of how to
properly conduct his own defense. " Relying on Gibbs v. Burke,"
the court concluded that "A defendant who pleads not guilty and
elects to go to trial is usually more in need of the assistance of a
lawyer than is one who pleads guilty. The record in this case evidences
petitioner's helplessness, without counsel and without more assistance
from the judge in defending himself against this charge . . .,s
In 1952, a California court, in People v. Agnew,5 held that the
constitutional rights of the misdemeanant had been violated by the
refusal of the trial court to appoint counsel as requested. The misde-
meanant was represented at the arraignment, but not at the time of
her plea nor at the time of her trial. In holding that this violated
due process the court adopted the following language of Wade v.
Mayo:"5
There are some individuals who, by reason of age, ignorance or mental
capacity, are incapable of representing themselves adequately in a
prosecution of a relatively simple nature. This incapacity is purely
"Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942). Supreme Court decisions prior to Gideon
gave some indication that the Court would apply the sixth amendment right to appointed
counsel in cases other than felonies. Operating under the special circumstances rule of Betts
v. Brady, the Court in Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947), stated that "By virtue of
the [sixth amendment] .. . counsel must be furnished to an indigent defendant prosecuted
in a federal court in every case, whatever the circumstances ...." Id. at 136-37. (Emphasis
added.) A year later, in Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948), the Court held that "The
practice in the federal courts as to the right of the accused to have the assistance of counsel
is derived from the Sixth Amendment which expressly requires that, in all criminal prose-
cutions in the courts of the United States, the accused shall have the assistance of counsel
for his defense." Id. at 660. (Emphasis added.)
5598 N.E.2d 250 (Ind. 1951).
56Id. at 252.
57337 U.S. 773 (1949).
5898 N.E.2d at 255.
5 250 P.2d 369 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. of Calif. 1952).
60 334 U.S. 672 (1947). The California court also relied upon the language of the United
States Supreme Court in Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951). "This Court repeatedly has
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to afford de-
fendants assistance of counsel in non-capital criminal cases where there are special circum-




personal and can be determined only by an examination and observa-
tion of the individual. Where such incapacity is present, the refusal to
appoint counsel is a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment."'
Finding the incapacity of the defendant to be patently present, the
court reversed the conviction, stating:
It is true, as counsel for the People contend, that none of the cited
cases deals with misdemeanors. This, however, does not serve to dis-
tinguish them, for the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment,
that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property without due
process, applies equally where the deprivation occurs by means of a
prosecution on a misdemeanor charge."'
Since the decision in Gideon, there has been some indication that
the Supreme Court will apply the court-appointed counsel doctrine
to misdemeanors. The Court of Appeals of Maryland" in 1961
affirmed the conviction and the two-year sentence of a misdemeanant
charged with being in possession of a concealed weapon. "4 The trial
judge had refused to appoint counsel on the ground that the charges
involved were not serious." The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the Maryland decision and remanded the case for
"further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright."" Upon
remand, the Maryland court reversed the conviction and remanded
for new trial, 7 indicating its belief that the Gideon decision applies
to at least some misdemeanors.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not reached the same
result. It recently faced the misdemeanor problem, but held Gideon
to be inapplicable. In Pizzitola v. State," the defendant was convicted
of aggravated assault, a misdemeanor, and assessed a punishment of
ninety days in jail. Article 753 of the Texas Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure" provides that "New trials, in cases of felony, shall be granted
for the following causes, and for no other: (1) Where the defend-
ant has been ... denied counsel." Article 754 0 provides "New trials
61 334 U.S. at 684. See also Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
"2 250 P.2d at 371.
"Patterson v. State, 227 Md. 194, 175 A.2d 746 (1961).
'
4 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36 (Supp. 1964).
s Maryland Rule 723b provided that unless a defendant elects to proceed without counsel
the court shall assign counsel in all capital or other serious cases.
"Patterson v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 372 U.S. 776 (1963).
"Patterson v. State, 231 Md. 509, 191 A.2d 237 (1963).
"8 374 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
"Tx. CODE CRIM. PROC, art. 753, S 1 (1950).
"' TEx. CODE CM. PROC. art. 754 (1950). This statute has been substantially changed
by art. 40.04 of the new criminal code. Denial of counsel in a misdemeanor case is not a
ground for new trial only if the maximum punishment which may be assessed is by fine only.
See note 110 infra and accompanying text.
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in misdemeanor cases may be granted for any cause specified in the
preceding article, except that contained in subdivision one of said
article." The court held that under these statutes, the trial court did
not err in overruling the motion for new trial based upon lack of
counsel, "this being a misdemeanor case."'" The defendant had argued
that Gideon v. Wainwright was applicable in this case. In response,
the court in overriding defendants motion for rehearing stated, "We
do not construe such case [Gideon] to embrace the misdemeanor
case at bar."'" Judge Morrison registered a strong dissent in the case,
stating: "I can bring myself to no other conclusion but the appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent accused in misdemeanor cases where
the possible punishment is confinement in jail is mandatory under the
Federal Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
The Fifth Circuit appears to be in complete accord with the dis-
senting views of Judge Morrison. In Harvey v. Mississippi,74 a federal
court for the first time ruled that an indigent defendant was denied
due process of law in a state court if not notified of his right to the
assistance of counsel though he be charged with a misdemeanor.
Harvey was charged with possession of whiskey, a misdemeanor in
Mississippi, punishable by a fine of up to $500 and up to ninety days
in jail.7' Harvey "pled guilty"'7' and received the maximum sentence.
He was neither notified of the sentence nor confined in jail until
after the statutory time for appeal had expired.77 The case reached
the Fifth Circuit on writ of habeas corpus.7"
The court noted that no doubt exists in a felony case that a de-
7' 374 S.W.2d at 447.
72 Id. at 448.
73 374 S.W.2d at 449.
14 340 F.2d 263 (sth Cir. 1965).
7' The case has certain racial overtones. Harvey had housed "Civil Rights Workers" who
were assisting in registering Negro applicants to vote in the State of Mississippi.
7' Harvey went to the home of the justice of the peace one night and entered his plea
of guilty in the justice's front yard. Only a fine had been discussed in the case and appar-
ently there was some confusion as to just what Harvey was pleading guilty to.
77Although sentence was imposed on July 23, 1964, the mittimus or order for arrest
was not issued until September 4, 1964. Harvey was picked up and put in jail on September
9, 1964.
7s An interesting occurrence in the case was that Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam, a
professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania, who argued the case before the Fifth
Circuit in Harvey's behalf did so without briefs. "Because of the speed with which that
habeas corpus appeal had to be processed in order to reach argument before Harvey's sentence
had run, the appeal was presented to the Fifth Circuit without briefs." Letter from
Professor Amsterdam, to author, April 6, 1965. This presents an interesting problem which
is likely to be frequently encountered in misdemeanor cases. Because of the short sentences
frequently imposed, the question may become moot before the constitutional issues may be
decided by a writ of habeas corpus, but the direct appeal from the conviction will, of
course, be open to the defendant.
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fendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel when entering a plea
in state as well as federal courts."9 As to the felony-misdemeanor
distinction, the court stated:
It is true that the cases which support appellant's argument [that
counsel should have been appointed] all involved felony convictions,
but their rationale does not seem to depend on the often purely formal
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. One accused of crime
has the right to the assistance of counsel before entering a plea because
of the disadvantageous position of an unassisted layman in a court of
law and because of the serious consequences which may attend a guilty
plea. Such disadvantages and consequences may weigh as heavily on an
accused misdemeanant as on an accused felon."0
The court then pointed to the federal misdemeanor case, Evans v.
Rives,"5 holding that the Constitution draws no distinction between
loss of liberty for a short period and such loss for a long one, and
concluded:
While the rule as thus stated has never been expressly extended to mis-
demeanor charges in state tribunals, it has been argued that such a
principle is implicit in the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright. . . . Be this as it may, the reasoning in Evans along with
other recent right-to-counsel decisions persuades us that we should
apply that rule in the present case. . . . The failure of notice to
Harvey of his right to the assistance of counsel invalidated his guilty
plea and rendered his conviction and incarceration constitutionally
improper.
This case would appear to have special significance not only because
of the ramifications it will have upon Texas law, but also because of
the fact that it would have been classified as a petty offense had the
case been tried under federal law. Harvey may be limited because of
the particularly flagrant circumstances involved in the case. A literal
reading of the opinion, however, would seem to indicate that the
possibility of even a ninety-day jail sentence would be a sufficient
deprivation of liberty to run afoul of due process if counsel has
not been provided for an indigent defendant. Had Harvey been de-
cided prior to the Court of Criminal Appeal's holding in Pizzitola
v. State, the outcome would seemingly have been different."
7" White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
so 340 F.2d at 269.
81126 F.2d 633 (1942).
2 340 F.2d at 271.
" A literal reading of Harvey would seem to indicate that Pizzitola's ninety-day sentence
due to a trial without benefit of counsel would be violative of due process. However, as
previously mentioned Harvey may be limited to its own special facts because of the par-




It would seem clear from the cases previously discussed, especially
the Supreme Court's treatment of Patterson v. State of Maryland,
that the right to counsel extends to at least some misdemeanors."
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the constitutional mandate in
Harvey v. Mississippi" indicates that the right may be broad indeed.
Perhaps the basic question involved is whether a line of any sort
should be drawn between classes of crimes for the purpose of pro-
viding the indigent defendant with representation. If a line is to be
drawn at all, the maximum penalty which may be imposed, rather
than an artificial and arbitrary classification, should be taken as the
frame of reference. These are problems of considerable difficulty
which reflect differing views by members of the Court. The sixth
amendment language extending the right to assistance of counsel to
"call criminal prosecutions" is certainly broad enough to cover all
offenses. Perhaps some guidelines may be drawn from Gideon itself.
The majority opinion in Gideon written by Mr. Justice Black re-
turned to the precedents established by Powell v. Alabama." The
Court held:
Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured
a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him .... The right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and
essential to fair trials in some countries but it is in ours. From the
very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid
great emphasis on procedural and substantial safeguards designed to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant
stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer
to assist him.8
This language likewise seems broad enough to encompass all offenses,
including misdemeanors of whatever seriousness. Though the language
is broad enough to cover all offenses, various members of the Court
would apparently not be willing to establish such an all inclusive
standard. The real lines of distinction in the Court's views are to be
drawn from the various concurring opinions of the Justices in
Gideon.
84 See notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text.
5 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
88287 U.S. 45 (1932).
87 372 U.S. at 344. (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 19:593
COMMENTS
Mr. Justice Douglas would incorporate the sixth amendment into
the fourteenth. Under this view, the indigent's right to counsel
would necessarily have the same breadth in state courts that it has
in federal courts. Douglas argues that not only should the funda-
mental guarantees of the Bill of Rights be made applicable to the
states by the fourteenth amendment, but that the fourteenth amend-
ment protects from infringement by the states all guarantees of the
Bill of Rights."8
Mr. Justice Harlan rejects the incorporation argument and main-
tains that the constitutional obligations of the states need not be
identical with those of the federal government." He would limit
Gideon to the more serious crimes.
The special circumstances rule has been formally abandoned in capital
cases, and the time has now come when it should be similarly abandoned
in noncapital cases, at least as to offenses which, as the one involved
here, carry the possibility of a substantial prison sentence. 0
He does state, however, that "Whether the rule should extend to all
criminal cases need not now be decided. '" 1
Another approach to the problem would be to use the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment."2 This clause has fre-
quently been applied in economic areas " and to cases dealing with
racial discrimination," but has seldom been applied in treating in-
equalities in the administration of criminal justice."5 Should the equal
"Bennett, Gideon in Retrospect, 38 Wis. BAR BULL. 34, 37 (1965). Mr. Justice Douglas
states in Gideon:
While I join the opinion of the Court, a brief historical resum6 of the relation
between the Bill of Rights and the first section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment seems pertinent. Since the adoption of that Amendment, ten Justices have
felt that it protects from infringement by the States the privileges, protections,
and safeguards granted by the Bill of Rights. . . . Unfortunately it has never
commanded a Court.
372 U.S. at 345-46.
8' When we hold a right or immunity, valid against the Federal Government,
to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and thus valid against the
States, I do not read our past decisions to suggest that by so holding, we
automatically carry over an entire body of federal law and apply it in full
sweep to the States. Any such concept would disregard the frequently wide
disparity between the legitimate interests of the States and of the Federal
Government, the divergent problems they face, and the significantly different
consequences of their actions. 372 U.S. at 352.
'old. at 351. (Emphasis added.)
91 Ibid.
85 Dissenting in Douglas v. California, decided the same day as Gideon, Mr. Justice
Harlan pointed out that if Gideon could have been decided on equal protection grounds,
there would have been no reason for the more complicated analysis which the Court in fact
employed. 372 U.S. 353, 363 (1963).
"See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
" See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9"Goldberg, Equality and Government Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205, 217 (1964);
Note, 25 U. PrrT. L. REv. 719 (1964).
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protection clause be found applicable, there certainly could be no
doubt as to the existence of state action. The decisions in Griffin
v. Illinois,' which provided the indigent with a transcript to aid in
perfecting his appeal," and Douglas v. California," which provided
court-appointed counsel on the indigent's first automatic appeal, are
perhaps the best known of the criminal cases decided under the
equal protection clause.
Discriminating against a man accused of a misdemeanor merely
because he is poor would seemingly do violence to the equal protection
clause. The fact that a man of means can retain the assistance of
counsel when charged with even a minor offense and thus better
safeguard his liberty and property provides some basis for showing
that inequality does exist when compared with the plight of the in-
digent charged with the same offense. Before the equal protection
clause can be utilized, however, there must be a showing of a signifi-
cant inequality which results in fundamental unfairness."' Whether
the unfairness is of such a basic fundamental character may be open
to some question.
As to the propriety of the indigent relying on the equal protec-
tion clause, Mr. Justice Goldberg in a recent lecture stated:
I cannot, with propriety, predict how much further the equal pro-
tection clause will require the Court to go in the elimination of eco-
nomic inequalities in the administration of criminal justice. But no
judge, lawyer or layman is inhibited from emphasizing the moral
imperative implicit in the noble concept of equal justice before the
law. What the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
command, it may still inspire.
Although the cases which have come before our Court have in-
volved the rights of the indigent at trial and on appeal, it should
not be forgotten that problems of equal criminal justice extend to the
near-poor and the average wage earner as well as the indigent, and
that such problems begin well before trial and continue after the
appeal."'
'6 "When the poor are denied equal justice in a criminal trial there can be no question
of state action, involvement and responsibility. The state is the 'plaintiff'; it elects or
appoints the judges; it hires the prosecutors; it retains and compensates expert witnesses
and investigators; it arrests and often incarcerates the accused; and it lodges the convicted
in its jails." Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. at 217.
97351 U.S. 12 (1956).
" Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Griffin v. Illinois, stated that: "There can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.
Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have
money enough to buy transcripts." 351 U.S. at 19.
"372 U.S. 353 (1963).
19'Note, 25 U. PITT. L. REV. 719 (1964).
.1 Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 205, 218-19 (1964).
Mr. Justice Goldberg concludes:
[P]roblems of poverty cut across the conceptual lines dividing criminal from
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Because the breadth of the equal protection clause is much greater
than that of the due process clause, a holding that an indigent is
equally entitled to counsel to safeguard his property as well as his
life and liberty would necessitate appointment of counsel in civil
matters as well as criminal. It is doubtful, at this time, that such a
sweeping change will become a reality. Application of the equal
protection clause to an indigent defendant accused of a misdemeanor
is a possibility, though presently it would seem remote.
V. CONCLUSION
If Gideon runs only so far as the felony-misdemeanor line, it
would merely give federal constitutional underpinning to the
already existing practice in thirty-seven states."' If, on the other
hand, Gideon is applied to all criminal prosecutions its effect would
be of considerably greater magnitude as only a minority of states
now require appointment of counsel for indigents accused of misde-
meanors.'03 Many statutes and court rules are ambiguous as to cover-
age in misdemeanor cases,'4 and the courts would likely move for-
ward only after great deliberation, for misdemeanor prosecutions
constitute numerically the greater part of state criminal practice. 2
In Texas, profound effects and significant changes will result from
applying the due process clause so as to require the assistance of
counsel in misdemeanor cases. As previously discussed,'O' article 754
in conjunction with article 753 currently prohibits a new trial in
a misdemeanor case when the defendant has been denied counsel.
Under the Fifth Circuit's holding in Harvey v. Mississippi,"°7 the
result achieved by the operation of these statutes would seem clearly
unconstitutional. This problem in Texas has been greatly alleviated by
civil cases, and that the poor person must be made aware of his legal rights
and obligations-whether they be in signing a lease, executing a credit agree-
ment, settling a domestic dispute, or paying taxes-before he can be expected
to participate in the community as a fully responsible citizen ...
The widespread participation of the Bar in the criminal process, which will
result from our recent decisions holding that all criminal defendants must,
upon request, be afforded representation at trial and on appeal, will bring the
present inequities of the criminal process more forcefully to the attention of
the Bar. This itself is desirable, for awareness of the problem is the first
and most important step toward solution. Id. at 226-27.
1 Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on
"The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHs. L. REV. 1, 17 (1962).
103 See Note, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 501, 510 (1960).
'04 See the compilation of statutes, rules, and decisions in Brief for Respondent, pp. 67-74,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
105 The foregoing discussion is taken from the "Due Process in State Criminal Proceedings"
section of The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. REv. 62, 105 (1963).
e See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
107 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
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the enactment of articles 26.04 and 40.0408 in the new Texas Crimi-
nal Code. As previously discussed, "whenever the court determines
at an arraignment or at any time prior to arraignment that an
accused charged with a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment is too poor to employ counsel, the court shall appoint
one or more practicing attorneys to defend him. 1.9 In addition,
denial of court-appointed counsel in at least some misdemeanor
cases is now recognized as a violation of the defendant's right to a
new trial. Article 40.04 now provides that denial of counsel "shall
not be available as ground for new trial in any misdemeanor case
where the maximum punishment may be by fine only.." Therefore,
as of January 1, 1966, the indigent misdemeanant in Texas will be
statutorily entitled to the assistance of counsel. While the new code
appears to be largely dispositive of the constitutional problem in
Texas, the difficulties facing the bench and bar in fulfilling the
statutory mandate will likely be substantial.
A recent article... indicates that in one Dallas County criminal
court alone, some 200 persons annually are tried on misdemeanor
counts without the benefit of counsel. The misdemeanor charges
cover such offenses as negligent homicide, writing hot checks, carry-
ing a knife, wife-beating, theft under $50.00, liquor law violations,
shoplifting, and driving while intoxicated. Penalties for these offenses
range up to fines of $3,000.00, three years imprisonment in the
county jail or both. The article further states that the judge of this
county court has appointed only three lawyers to defend misde-
meanants in over ten years. These attorneys had to defend the accused
without pay, as there was no provision under state law for remunerat-
ing assigned counsel in misdemeanor cases.
Perhaps the real difficulties presented by the scope of the indigent
defendant's right to counsel center around the increased burden
which would be placed on the bench and bar. The increase in the
number of cases to be docketed for trial would likely be substantial
even if right to counsel is limited somewhere above granting the
privilege to all misdemeanants. The projected demand upon the bar
is certainly staggering, especially as the situation currently exists re-
'
08 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. (1965).
'
0 9 TEx. CODE CRuM. PROC. § 26.04 (1965). (Emphasis added.) This new rule is not
completely dispositive of the constitutional problem in Texas. If an indigent is convicted
of a misdemeanor punishable by fine only, the fact that he is truly indigent would most
likely prevent him from being able to pay such fine. This would likely result in his being
placed in jail to "work-off" the fine which would seem to present the same "deprivation of
liberty" as if he had been sentenced to jail in the first instance.
°Id. at S 40.04.
1 Dallas Morning News, Apr. 4, 1965, p. 26, col. 1.
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quiring attorneys to serve without compensation when they are
court-appointed in Texas misdemeanor cases punishable by fine only
and federal petty offense cases."'
It was not until the enactment of article 494a in 1959 that any
sort of compensation was authorized for court-appointed attorneys
in Texas."1 This act provided for the discretionary payment of court
appointed attorneys at the rate of $25.00 per day in court in the
defense of persons charged with felonies, but only $10.00 on
pleas of guilty. The compensation to be paid court appointed
counsel has been changed by the new Texas Criminal Code. Article
26.05..4 now provides for the payment from the general fund of the
county in which the prosecution was instituted a fee of not less than
$25.00 nor more than $50.00 for each day in trial court representing
the accused. If the death penalty is being sought, a fee of not less
than $25.00 nor more than $100.00 is provided for. In addition, ex-
penses incurred of not more than $250.00 have been authorized for
purposes of investigation and expert testimony. The above fee
schedule is applicable to both felonies and misdemeanors punishable
by imprisonment. The minimum fee will be allowed automatically
unless the trial judge orders a greater fee within five days of the
judgment.
As to attorneys appointed to defend indigents in federal courts,
the Criminal Justice Act of 1964' has provided compensation at a
rate not exceeding $15.00 per hour in court and $10.00 per hour out
of court, with total compensation not to exceed $500.00 in a case in
which one or more felonies are charged. Provision has also been made
for purposes of obtaining expert testimony. The same hourly rate
provided for attorneys in felony cases is also applicable to misde-
meanors other than petty offenses, but not to exceed $300.00.
Solutions which would provide adequate representation are being
sought on many fronts. Plans being experimented with include public
115 The demands upon the bench and bar would be even more staggering should the
Court find the indigent's lack of counsel to be a violation of the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of equal protection. Such an extension would presumably apply as readily to
civil cases as it would to criminal cases. One writer has stated: "Some minor offenses, as
violating a parking ordinance, are such that the utility of providing counsel is far out-
weighed by the economic and administrative burden it would cause. Violations of the
sort described above which are usually disposed of by summary proceedings should not be
classified as criminal proceedings and are therefore not within the pale of the sixth amend-
ment." Note, 25 U. PITT. L. REv. 719, 824-26 (1964). The economic and administrative
burdens in both state and federal prosecutions may well influence the constitutional standard
to be applied.
.. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 494a (1959).
114 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.05 (1965).
"1578 Star. 552 (1964), as amended 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
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defender systems, private defender systems, combinations of the two
systems, legal aid clinics utilizing the services of law students, and
various plans devised by bar associations for representation by private
attorneys. Because of the practical necessities involved, it would seem
that some balance must be struck between the positive arguments
for right to counsel on one hand, and the social utility of requiring
counsel at certain types of hearings, the costs of financing such an
operation, the administrative burden upon the bench, and the prac-
tical burden on the bar on the other hand.
